

REMARKS

Claims 1-17 are pending. Claims 1, 9 and 17 are independent.

Claims 1-17 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over U.S. Patent No. 6,754,662 (Li) in view of U.S. Patent Publication No. 2002/0039365 (Kalpathy). Applicant traverses.

Independent claim 1 recites, *inter alia*, a packet search device that comprises “a first search processing means for searching predetermined conditional statements corresponding to a plurality of information areas included in header information of said packet” and “a second search processing means for searching the first search results of said first search processing means with a second search method that is different from said first search method.”

It was conceded in the Office Action that Li does not teach these limitations. The position was taken in the Office Action that Kalpathy teaches these limitations. Applicants disagree.

As was discussed in detail in the previous response, Kalpathy shows a cache table for pipeline processing packet searches. Kalpathy teaches that a subset of entries from a search table can be duplicated in a cache table, e.g., the “Cache . . . can store every 128th entry of the larger 8K Table.” Kalpathy, paragraph [0022].

In Kalpathy, a first search (“Search Stage Zero”) is performed on the entries in the *cache*. Kalpathy’s second search (“Search Stage One”) *searches the larger 8K Table* based on the results of the first search, and does not search the results of the first search:

In the scheme illustrated in FIG. 3, the Search Stage Zero accesses the Cache and performs the first six search cycles. Based on the results of the search performed by accessing the Cache, the Search Stage One accesses the larger 8K Table [i.e., not the results of the first search] to perform the remaining seven search cycles. *Id.*

In other words, while it is the Cache that is searched in Search Stage Zero, it is the 8K Table (not the results of Search Stage Zero) that is searched in Search Stage One. The two search

steps disclosed in Kalpathy are clearly set forth in Fig. 5. In that figure, step 510 states “Search Cache” while step 520 states “Search Table Based on Search Results of Search in Cache.” Nothing could be clearer. The second search in Kalpathy *uses* the results of the first search (i.e., the search conducted at step 510), but utilizes those results to *search the Table*. Not only is there no teaching or suggestion that the results of the search conducted at step 510 are what is being searched in step 520, but Fig. 5 clearly and unambiguously shows that it is *not* the search results of step 510 that are being searched in step 520; it is the Table that is being searched.

In spite of the clear and explicit teaching in Kalpathy that the second stage searches the 8K table, and *not* the results of the search of his first stage, the Response to Arguments appeared to be arguing that Kalpathy second stage must in fact search the search results of the first search. In particular, the position is taken that because the second stage search in Kalpathy is based on the first stage search results, it must at some point “search” those search results.

In the first place, there is no teaching in Kalpathy that any searching is done, in a second stage search, on the search results of the first stage. The Examiner’s surmise that *basing* the second search on the results of the first search means that a search must be done on those results is simply unsupported by Kalpathy. The only search taught by Kalpathy done by Search Stage One is a search on the larger 8K table (in paragraph [0045] another example uses a 16K table). And of course, at least because there is no such search being done, there is no teaching or remote suggestion that a different method of search is used on the search results from that used in the first search, as in claim 1.

Therefore, Kalpathy fails to disclose that the results of the first search are then searched again by a different search method, as required by the independent claims. In the absence of any teaching or suggestion of this feature of the invention, claim 1 is believed to be in condition for allowance. The other independent claims recite a substantially similar limitation and are believed patentable for the same reasons.

In view of the foregoing, applicant believes the pending application is in condition for allowance.

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